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THE OVERLOOKED DAISY CHAIN 
PROBLEM IN SALMAN 
FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ* 
Abstract: In Salman v. United States, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to re-
solve a conflict with United States v. Newman as to when corporate insiders re-
ceive sufficient personal benefit from making gifts of inside information to make 
the tip and consequent trade illegal. This Essay explores an overlooked aspect of 
these cases, the “daisy chain problem,” which involves how the personal benefit 
element for illegal tipping applies to the subsequent tips that occur when the re-
cipient of information from the corporate insider, in turn, passes the information 
on to others. This daisy chain problem could potentially distinguish the facts of 
Salman and Newman and thus deserves the attention of the Court and commenta-
tors. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court recently heard oral arguments in Salman v. United 
States.1 The Court granted certiorari to resolve the clash between Salman and 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s 2014 decision in United 
States v. Newman as to when corporate insiders receive sufficient personal 
benefit from making gifts of inside information to make the tip and consequent 
trade illegal.2 Interestingly, both Salman and Newman ignored another aspect 
of the personal benefit issue raised by the facts of both cases. This aspect, 
which I refer to as the “daisy chain problem,” involves how the personal bene-
fit element for illegal tipping applies to the subsequent tips that occur when the 
recipient of information from the corporate insider, in turn, passes the infor-
mation on to others. Because the daisy chain problem will become pressing 
after Salman unless the Court addresses it in its opinion, this problem is worth 
exploring. 
I. UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM 
For the most part, the prohibition on insider trading in the United States 
comes from opinions of the Supreme Court interpreting Section 10(b) of the 
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 2 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Salman, 136 S. Ct. 899 (2016),  
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b–5 promulgated by the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission.3 These opinions create a fairly elaborate set of 
rules governing when insider trading constitutes fraud in connection with the 
purchase or sale of a security, thereby violating Section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5. 
Essentially, corporate insiders cannot legally trade on material non-public in-
formation about the company for which they work, and persons cannot legally 
trade on information they misappropriate through the pretense that they could 
be trusted with such information.4 Critically for present purposes, in the 1983 
case Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission, the Supreme Court held 
that insiders violate the law when they provide others with information upon 
which the insiders cannot legally trade (thereby becoming a “tipper”) and re-
ceive some personal benefit from providing the tip for the recipient’s trading.5 
If the recipient of the information (the “tippee”) knows or should have known 
he or she received the information illegally, then the tippee also cannot legally 
trade. 
Benefits the tipper might receive from tipping include money from selling 
the information, other inside information from swapping the information, or 
perhaps some reputational gain. Language in Dirks suggesting that the tipper 
can obtain a benefit from making a gift of information—based upon the ra-
tionale that this is equivalent to the tipper trading on the information and mak-
ing a gift of the proceeds—created the issue in the case now before the Court 
in Salman and also in the Second Circuit’s decision in Newman. Yet, with all 
the focus in Salman and Newman on the benefit of making gifts, little attention 
has been given to the question of how Dirks’s “benefit of the tip” test applies 
to chains of tipping, as occurred in both Salman and Newman. 
The facts in Salman illustrate the problem. Maher, the insider, tipped his 
brother, Michael, who, in turn, tipped his friend (and Maher’s brother-in-law), 
Salman.6 In order for Salman’s trades to be illegal, must Maher, in addition to 
benefiting from his original tips to Michael, also have benefited from Mi-
chael’s tips to Salman? Alternatively, is it sufficient that Michael benefited 
from his own tips to Salman, as long as Maher benefited from his tips to Mi-
chael? Or, given a benefit to Maher from his tips to Michael, is a benefit to 
either Maher or Michael from Michael’s tipping Salman even necessary? 
In some instances, it will not matter who, if anyone, must benefit from the 
subsequent tips and trades in a daisy chain of tipping in order for the subse-
quent tips and trades to be illegal. For example, suppose a corporate insider, 
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Steve, sells inside corporate information to a stock analyst, Dirk. Steve under-
stands that Dirk will not trade himself, but will instead provide the information 
to Dirk’s clients for them to trade (in exchange for which Dirk will gain the 
continued patronage of his clients). In this example, both Steve and Dirk clear-
ly benefit from Dirk’s tip to Dirk’s clients, and this benefit was contemplated 
when Steve tipped Dirk. Steve benefits from Dirk’s tip to Dirk’s clients be-
cause Dirk would not have paid Steve for the information without the plan (of 
which Steve was aware) to pass the information on to his clients. Dirk benefits 
by the continued patronage of his clients. Hence, Dirk’s tip to his clients is il-
legal and, if the clients are aware of Steve and Dirk’s dealings, their trades are 
illegal too. Indeed, any other result would drive a huge hole through the middle 
of the insider trading prohibition, since insiders could then simply sell infor-
mation to parties who will not trade, but will instead sell the information to 
other parties who will. 
To see where problems arise, compare the following example. Valerie, a 
CEO, gives her lover, a politician named Francois, valuable inside information 
about her company as a gift to celebrate the seventh anniversary of their rela-
tionship. Unknown to Valerie, Francois has started a fling with Julie. Francois 
passes on the information as a gift to Julie, who trades on it. Let us assume that 
the gift of information from Valerie to Francois meets the personal benefit test 
for Valerie, and that the gift of information from Francois to Julie provides a 
personal benefit for Francois. It is difficult to imagine that Valerie—even if she 
is as open-minded about such things as the French—perceives any benefit 
from Francois’ tip to Julie, or that part of the value of the gift she intended to 
bestow on Francois was the value he would obtain from giving the information 
to another woman. Hence, in this example, it matters to whom (if anyone) 
there must be a personal benefit from the subsequent tip. If it is just the inter-
mediate tippee/tipper (Francois), then Francois’ tip and Julie’s trade (if she is 
aware of the source of the information) are illegal. If the personal benefit must 
accrue only to the original insider/tipper (Valerie), then Francois’ tip and Ju-
lie’s trade are legal. 
If the rule is that the benefit of the subsequent tips must flow back to the 
original tipper in order to be illegal, then the complexity of the prosecution in a 
case like Salman multiplies, even if the Supreme Court holds that gifts benefit 
the giver regardless of whether they are offered as part of a quid pro quo. Put-
ting aside the happenstance that Salman is Maher’s brother-in-law, how do 
Michael’s gifts of information to his friend Salman benefit Maher, who intend-
ed simply to provide a gift to Michael? Perhaps part of the value of the gift 
Maher intended to bestow upon Michael is the ability to benefit by giving the 
information to others for trading. Yet, how can this be established? Should we 
rely on Maher’s testimony? 
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Moreover, if the rule is that the benefit of each subsequent tip must flow 
back to the original insider/tipper, does this mean that the original insid-
er/tipper must have contemplated this benefit when he or she provided the 
original tip, or is it sufficient that the subsequent tip objectively benefits the 
original tipper? Suppose, for example, that Maher sold the inside information 
to an arbitrager named Boesky, who turned around and sold the information to 
a trader named Milken, who traded on it. One can argue that Maher personally 
benefited from Boesky’s subsequent sale of the information for Milken’s trad-
ing. After all, Boesky’s willingness to pay for the information depends upon 
his ability to profit from its trading value, and he profits from the trading val-
ue—thereby dictating how much he is willing to pay—by either trading on the 
information himself or by selling the information for another to trade. Still, if 
Maher did not know that Boesky planned to sell the information, one might 
argue that, whatever the objective benefit Maher received from Boesky’s sale 
of the information, this was not part of the contemplated benefit that made 
Maher’s tip illegal. Of course, a rule that demands the original insider/tipper 
have contemplated the subsequent tips not only compounds the complexity of 
the prosecution, but also can tempt the intermediate tippee/tipper (Boesky in 
this example) to mislead the original insider/tipper by saying that the tippee 
plans to trade, not tip. After all, if Boesky does not trade, then he is not liable 
for trading, and if the tip to Milken is legal because Maher did not realize it 
would occur, then Boesky is not liable for the tip. 
II. EXISTING AUTHORITY 
Interestingly, there is not much authority on the question of who (if any-
one) must benefit from the subsequent tips in order for remote tipping and 
trading to be illegal. Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission involved a 
tipping chain in which Dirks, a stock analyst, was both a tippee who received 
information from a corporate whistleblower, and a tipper, passing the infor-
mation on to Dirks’s clients to use in trading (from which Dirks benefited in 
commissions and reputation).7 Dirks’s benefit, however, was irrelevant to the 
Supreme Court given the lack of benefit to the whistleblower in passing the 
inside information to Dirks—thereby never forcing the Court to consider who, 
if anyone, needed to benefit from Dirks’s further tipping the information he 
received from the insider. 
In 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States 
v. Newman, similarly did not address what, if any, benefit was required for the 
middle tips in the daisy chains involved in that case.8 The court found that the 
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insiders at the beginnings of the chains did not benefit from the initial tips, 
and, in any event, there was no proof that the prosecuted traders at the end of 
the chains were aware of the circumstances at the beginning of the chains.9 By 
contrast, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision to uphold 
the district court’s conviction in Salman v. United States should have called for 
someone to address the issue outlined earlier in this Essay as to whether Maher 
or Michael must benefit from Michael’s tips to Salman in order for Salman’s 
trading to be illegal.10 
A few federal court decisions address the question, with conflicting re-
sults. In 2011, in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Obus, the Second 
Circuit ruled that, in addition to the insider benefiting from the initial tip, the 
intermediate tipper/tippee must benefit from making the subsequent tip in or-
der for the subsequent tippee to be liable for trading11. In other words, it adopt-
ed the chain of individual benefits approach.12 By contrast, in 1984, the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan in Schick v. Steiger found no 
illegal trading by a subsequent tippee when there was no allegation that the 
insider intended the intermediate tippee/tipper to disclose the inside infor-
mation to other traders.13 It also found that the insider did not gain personally 
from the intermediate tipper/tippee’s further disclosure—thereby indicating 
that the benefit of subsequent tips must flow back to the original insid-
er/tipper.14 
Commentators have generally avoided taking a position on the topic; I 
confess that even my own treatise on corporation law contents itself with simp-
ly identifying the issue.15 The two leading treatises on insider trading contain 
brief discussions, though these too ultimately leave the topic as an open ques-
tion.16 
                                                                                                                           
 9 See id. 
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 13 See Schick v. Steiger, 583 F. Supp. 841, 848 (E.D. Mich. 1984). 
 14 See id. 
 15 See FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 622 (2d ed. 2010). 
 16 DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, 18 INSIDER TRADING: REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT AND PREVEN-
TION § 4:10 (2016); WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING: LIABILITY AND 
COMPLIANCE § 5.03 (2013). 
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III. RESOLVING THE ISSUE 
So what should the rule be? To answer this question, it is necessary to un-
derstand the rationale behind the Court’s requirement from Dirks v. Securities 
and Exchange Commission that the insider must receive a benefit from making 
the tip in order for tipping and trading upon the tip to be illegal. This rationale 
is most definitely not that the law should limit disparity in information among 
stock traders in order to maintain some notion of integrity in the market. If that 
were the goal, the law would prohibit trading based on tips traceable to an in-
sider regardless of whether the insider received a benefit from making the tip. 
This is the law in Europe, but the Supreme Court rejected this approach in 
Dirks.17 Instead, Dirks’s tipper/tippee liability rule is simply a necessary (but 
limited) patch designed to prevent the prohibition on corporate insiders profit-
ing by trading on inside information from turning into the hollow letter it 
would become if insiders could still profit by passing on the information for 
others to use in trading. In other words, if the law seeks to prohibit certain per-
sons from profiting by trading on inside information, then the law must prevent 
such persons from profiting by passing on the information for another person’s 
trading. This prevents people who hold insider information from doing indi-
rectly what they cannot do directly. 
Based upon this rationale, we can quickly dismiss the idea that no further 
benefit is necessary to make subsequent tips and trades illegal as long as the 
original tip benefited the insider and subsequent tippees are aware of the origi-
nally tainted source of the information. This would create the sort of tainted 
fruit approach to inside information that the Supreme Court rejected in Dirks. 
True, in this instance, unlike Dirks, the taint arises from the insider’s original 
sin of tipping for personal benefit. Still, it is difficult to see how a subsequent 
tip constitutes part of the insider’s effort to obtain profits from another person’s 
trading, when that tip does not produce even an indirect benefit for the insider. 
Nor is the subsequent tip part of an effort by the intermediate tippee/tipper to 
profit from information that the intermediate tippee/tipper cannot legally use 
for trading, when the intermediate tippee/tipper does not receive a benefit from 
making the subsequent tip. Hence, imposing liability when the subsequent tip 
does not produce some benefit from passing on information for trading—for 
instance, because the intermediate tipper/tippee was just gossiping—is contra-
ry to the Dirks rationale for tipper/tippee liability. 
On the other hand, tempting as it might be for the Supreme Court to cut 
back on the prospects for remote tipping liability by holding that the benefit of 
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subsequent tips must flow back to the original insider/tipper, the Court should 
reject such an approach. Instead, the better rule is that a chain of independent 
benefits—beginning with the insider’s benefit from the original tip and extend-
ing through each subsequent tippee/tipper’s benefit from passing on the infor-
mation—should be sufficient to establish the illegality of the subsequent tips. 
There are two rationales for this conclusion. 
The first rationale is pragmatic. As illustrated by Salman v. United States 
and United States v. Newman, determining whether the original insider/tipper 
received a sufficient personal benefit in the initial tip is already often difficult 
enough without vastly complicating the problem by trying to decide when sub-
sequent tipping benefits the original tipper. As illustrated by the examples dis-
cussed above, matters become impossibly speculative if courts must find that 
the benefit of later tips flowed back to the original tipper, especially if this re-
quires that the original insider somehow contemplated this benefit at the time 
of the initial tip. 
Beyond pragmatics, there is principle, which in this instance points in the 
same direction. Specifically, looking at whether each intermediate tippee/tipper 
benefited from his or her tip, rather than demanding that the benefit of later 
tips flow all the way back to the original insider/tipper, carries out the underly-
ing policy behind tipper/tippee liability, which, as explained above, is to pre-
vent parties from doing indirectly what would be illegal for them to do directly 
(profiting from trading on inside information). Among the persons who cannot 
legally trade are tippees (if they know or should have known of their tipper’s 
breach), because they face liability as an accessory to an insider’s breach if 
they trade. In other words, tipper/tippee liability does not merely preclude the 
insider from profiting by passing on information for another’s trading in ex-
change for some personal benefit, it also holds that the knowing tippee cannot 
profit from trading on the information. Following the purpose for tipper/tippee 
liability set out above, if the knowing tippee cannot legally profit from trading, 
the knowing tippee should not be able to profit by passing along the infor-
mation for another’s trading in exchange for some personal benefit. 
Rest assured, however, that looking to the intermediate tippee/tipper’s 
benefit in each step of the daisy chain, rather than insisting that the benefit of 
subsequent tips flow all the way back to the original insider/tipper, should not 
create overly broad liability. This is because, under this theory, the prosecutor 
must prove not only that each tippee/tipper along the chain gained a personal 
benefit from passing on the tip, but also that each tippee along the chain knew 
or should have known that he or she illegally received information. This would 
include requiring the prosecutor to show that tippee/tipper knew or should 
have known that each prior tippee along the chain received a benefit and had 
the requisite knowledge to make that tippee’s tip illegal. Establishing that level 
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of proof should be manageable in compact chains, such as in Salman, but be-
comes problematic in attenuated chains as in Newman. 
In fact, one might worry that insiders will seek to exploit this proof prob-
lem with a scheme of information laundering (like money laundering, but only 
with inside information) in which they sell inside information to tippees, who 
will sell the information to subsequent tippees until the final buyer can plausi-
bly hide behind the difficulty of proving the requisite knowledge of illegality 
up the entire chain. To avoid this, the option to prove the illegality of subse-
quent tips based upon the initial insider/tipper having anticipated his or her 
indirect benefit from the subsequent tips should remain a viable theory as well. 
In other words, either theory of benefit from the daisy chain should be ac-
ceptable. 
CONCLUSION 
While the parties, courts, and commentators in Salman v. United States 
and United States v. Newman have been preoccupied by evaluating when giv-
ing the gift of inside information benefits the giver, an overlooked issue in 
these cases involves how the personal benefit element for illegal tipping ap-
plies to the subsequent tips that occur when the recipient of information from 
the corporate insider, in turn, passes the information on to others. This aspect, 
which I refer to as the “daisy chain problem,” might actually distinguish the 
facts of Salman and Newman and deserves critical attention. 
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